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THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S ALLEGIANCE TO PLEA BARGAINS WITH
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME
Christina Brito
INTRODUCTION
Has our criminal justice system become so ineffective by allowing prosecutors to plea
bargain with our rights? Today, defendants are more likely convicted through plea bargains than
through a traditional trial by judge and jury. In addition, statistics continue to show the wide
disparities between minorities and whites within the American prison population. Is there a
correlation between these racial disparities in our prisons and convictions obtained through plea
bargains? The disproportionate effects of minority defendants being convicted merits a discussion
whether plea bargains affect racial minorities more than other defendants. This article will discuss
how plea bargaining is a relatively unregulated area of the criminal justice system and how this
lack of regulation is likely to be particularly harmful to racial minorities. Racial injustice is made
worse through plea bargaining because the process is under the sole discretion of prosecutors who
have the freedom to subjectively decide what a particular defendant deserves without any
safeguards to assure plea offers are not motivated by pre-textual bias. Our pledge of allegiance to
the flag concludes with liberty and justice for all; ironically, the current criminal justice system
and its allegiance to plea bargaining ends with liberty and justice only for some.

Part I of this article will begin with a historical background of how plea bargain was
developed and how it has evolved within the judicial branch. Here, I will describe what doubts
our Supreme Court justices had with respects to plea bargains and their attempts to implement
safeguards in order to protect an individual’s constitutional rights. Next, I will discuss how plea
bargaining functions in our society and how it is relatively unregulated in the law. Prosecutors
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have tremendous discretion in the area of plea negotiations. The role of a prosecutor allows them
to decide if, when and what to charge a particular defendant with. Yet, there are no safeguards
that protect defendants from the possibility of offers being made based on their race or
socioeconomic status.

In addition, statutes with mandatory minimums (or the Sentencing

Guidelines in the Federal System) empowers a prosecutor to single handedly create what he or she
feels is the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant and what he or she deserves as a plea
offer. Consequently, plea bargaining becomes the most critical point of a defendant’s timeline
prior to conviction and defendants are left with heavily relying on what their counsels advise them
to do. Thus, the Supreme Court’s interpretation on what is effective assistance of counsel and
what is considered a sufficient reasonable lawyer during pre-trial negotiations also becomes very
important. Through the cases in this section, I attempt to read into what the judge’s intentions
were in the process of constitutionalizing plea bargains. Even with Supreme Court decisions to
guide the lower courts, there is still confusion on what is or is not allowed during plea negotiations.
The cases that have been decided in the context of plea bargains do not help the fact that there is a
lack of regulation when it comes to prosecutorial discretions.
Part II of this Article will discuss the overall racial patterns of racial disparities in our
criminal justice system.

Statistical data demonstrates how old historical patterns of racial

inequality still exists. Over ninety-four percent of convictions are produced through guilty pleas
and minorities are still the majority in our prisons. I will show how these disproportionate effects
of convictions have a class race correlation with plea bargains and why racial injustice is made
worse by these deals. Statistics also show how racial minorities are likely to be poorer and less
likely to afford legal representation. As a result, most minority defendants end up having no real
choice but to plea bargain..
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Part III will focus on why we need more information on plea bargaining. The relatively
unregulated area of plea bargaining enables prosecutorial discretion and unequal bargaining
powers which leads to unjust results. Allowing unjust results to continue undermines the character
of our society and our commitment to fairness. Acknowledging that our current criminal justice
system has transitioned form convictions by trials to pleas, forces this country to face the urgent
to change the process.
Through plea bargaining the illusion of liberty, justice and mercy is dealt, leaving
defendants with a false sense of satisfaction. The disproportionate effects of plea bargaining and
incarceration with minority defendants, especially indigent minorities, demonstrates the inequality
that stems from this process. Racial injustice is made worse through plea bargaining because the
process is under the sole discretion of prosecutors who have the freedom to subjectively decide
what a particular defendant deserves without any safeguards to assure plea offers are not motivated
by pre-textual biases. Our pledge of allegiance to the flag concludes with liberty and justice for
all; ironically, the current criminal justice system and its allegiance to plea bargaining ends with
liberty and justice only for some.

I.

A PLEA FOR LIBERTY

A. Constitutionality of Plea Bargaining
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Several constitutional rights are implicated and waived when a defendant enters a guilty
plea.1 These rights include the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial to effective assistance of counsel.2

Plea negotiations are

predominantly discussed by prosecutors and defense counsel prior to plea deals reaching the
defendant and the Sixth Amendment becomes implicated when there is ineffective assistance of
counsel. A guilty plea implicates the Fifth Amendment when the defendant admits to the charges
against him or herself and is basically standing as a witness against him or herself.3 This is why
the voluntariness aspect of a guilty plea is significant to a defendant’s confession.4 The Supreme
Court’s efforts to ensure a guilty plea is free from coercion, inducements, subtle, or blatant threats,
stems from a defendant giving up these constitutional rights.5 When a defendant pleas guilty he
or she waives their right to a trial before a jury or a judge and from that point the only thing left is
judgment and sentencing. Accordingly, the plea bargaining process is the most critical point in a
defendant’s timeline prior to his or her conviction.6
Prior to 1970 it was understood that prosecutors may never produce pleas by “actual or
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant”.7 In 1959,
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Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (describing the importance of a guilty plea as being more than a mere
confession or condition of conduct because it is a conviction where the only thing left to address is the punishment).
2
Id.
3
Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
4
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 239-242 (discussing that the same standard that is used to determine a waiver of a right to counsel
applies to accepting a guilty plea. The record must show, by an allegation or evidence, that the defendant voluntarily
and knowingly entered his plea prior to accepting a guilty; presuming a constitutional waiver is unacceptable.).
5
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 239, 243-244 (involving defendant Edward Boykin, a black defendant, was indigent and
appointed counsel. He was then indicted and tried for robbery, which was punishable by death. Three days later at
his arraignment, Boykin pled guilty to robbery and as a result was sentenced to death by electrocution. Four of the
seven justices, on their own motion, questioned the constitutionality of the trial court accepting a guilty plea prior to
determining if it was made voluntarily and knowingly.).
6
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; See generally Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (describing the importance) (“That a guilty plea is a
grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment has long been recognized.”); See also Missouri
v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administration of
the criminal justice system . . . .”).
7
Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
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defendant Robert Brady was charged with kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1201(a) and faced
a maximum sentence of death.8 After Brady discovered his codefendant would pled guilty and be
able to testify against him, Brady pled guilty and was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment.9 Eight
years later Brady attacked his sentence claiming his guilty plea was involuntary because 18 U.S.C.
1201(a) functioned as coercion, causing him to fear the death penalty.10 However, when a
defendant has a strong case against him or herself it may not necessarily be coercion.11 The Court
noted that all relevant circumstances must be considered, including when a defendant is aware of
his or her very slim chance of acquittal if they chose to exercise their right to a trial.12 As long as
a guilty plea is not produced by mental coercion and is entered intelligently, knowingly, and
voluntarily, a defendant’s guilty plea is constitutional.13
Even though Brady v. U.S. endorsed the constitutionality of pleas, it was done with a raised
eyebrow warning; “We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty
pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by
competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves.”14 Because plea negotiations likely begin
with discussions between a prosecutor and a defense counsel, defendants heavily rely on the
assistance of counsel in order to make decisions on plea offers. In Hill v. Lockhart the defendant
claimed his guilty plea was involuntary because he pled guilty after his counsel gave him incorrect
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Id. at 743.
Id. at 745.
10
Id. at 743.
11
Id. at 749 (describing Brady’s guilty plea was based off of other matters in the case and not by reason of the statute.
In other words, the Court declared that all relevant circumstances must be considered, which includes Brady being
aware of his codefendant’s ability to testify against him as one of the triggers that led for Brady to have pled guilty.).
12
Id. at 751 (declining to hold that a guilty plea is compelled or invalid whenever the defendant feared a higher penalty
and entered a plea for purposes of a lesser penalty).
13
Id. at 748 (explaining the voluntariness standard for accepting a guilty plea. The Court adopted this test for
determining the validity of a guilty plea); See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 at 31 (“The standard was
and remains whether the plea represents a knowingly and intelligent choice among the alternative course of action
open to the defendant.”).
14
Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
9
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information about his parole eligibility date.15 However, the Court found that the defendant’s
claims was involuntary only because he relied on the information and advice from his counsel.16
On that account, the voluntariness of the plea, as a result of the advice from his counsel, should be
governed by the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington for ineffective assistance of
counsel.17 This standard test requires for the defendant to show “that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness”18 and “that there is a reasonable probability, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”19
Specifically, the defendant has to demonstrate prejudice resulted because of the alleged ineffective
advice or lack of advice from counsel.20
In a more recent case where a counsel’s advice had drastic implications, the Court
emphasized on the importance of a defendant having the right information in order to make a valid
decision during the process of plea bargaining.21 In US v. Padilla defendant Jose Padilla was not
advised about the deportation consequences of his conviction if he pled guilty. 22 Not only was he
not advised, he was also assured by his counsel that because he was a long time resident of the
United States he did not have to worry about deportation.23 Further, there was no doubt from the
record presented to the Supreme Court that Padilla’s removal from the United States would result
from his guilty plea.24 Consequently, Padilla was able to successfully show that his counsel’s

15

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53 (1985).
Id. at 56.
17
Id. at 57 (declaring the same two-part standard is “applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out the plea
process.”).
18
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
19
Id. at 694.
20
Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-58 (holding the two-part test applies to guilty pleas based on ineffectiveness of counsel).
21
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (recognizing “that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase
of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.”).
22
Id. at 359 (pointing to the false sense of security set by Padilla’s counsel when his counsel referenced to Padilla
being a permanent resident in the U.S. for over 40 years, as if deportation would not be considered).
23
Id.
24
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 (“Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for
deportation simply from reading the text of the statute. . . . [C]ounsel provided him false assurance . . . .”).
16
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representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness because the deportation
consequences were absolutely clear from the record alone.25 The Court stated on the record how
a well informed defendant allows both sides to reach an agreement that can “better satisfy the
interests” of both the government and the defendant.26
Two years after Padilla v. Kentucky the Court again highlighted the importance of advice
from counsel during plea negotiations.27 In Missouri v. Frye, the prosecutor advised defense
counsel of three different plea offers for the accused.28 Here the Court addressed “whether the
constitutional right to counsel extends to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse
or are rejected.”29 None of the offers were conveyed to the defendant.30 Instead, defense counsel
let the offers expire without the defendant’s knowledge that the offers were available.31 Defendant
Frye claimed if he had known about the plea offers, he would have entered a guilty plea to a
misdemeanor offense, instead of the felony charge.32 Frye was deprived of his constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel because he was kept in the dark about the options available to
him in furtherance of making a knowledgeable decision.33 Missouri v. Frye, highlighted yet again
how a defendant that is well informed and has an opportunity to consider his or her available

Id. at 369 (finding counsel’s deficient advice to fail the first prong of the Strickland standard. The Court then
reversed and remanded for the lower court to determine if Padilla is entitled to relief, which depends on a showing of
prejudice as a result of his guilty plea; the second prong.) .
26
Id. at 373.
27
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 141 (2012) (noting how in Padilla the Supreme Court had “rejected the argument
that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes errors by defense counsel.”).
28
Frye, 566 U.S. at 138-139 (discussing defendant Galin Frye was charged with driving with a revoked license and
because he had three prior convictions of that same offense, the State of Missouri charged him with a class D felony
facing a maximum of four years of imprisonment. Frye’s attorney did not communicate offers presented by the
prosecutor, one of which included a reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor charge with a maximum of one year
instead of four.).
29
Frye, 566 U.S. at 138.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 138 (discussing along with the guilty plea to the lesser charge of a misdemeanor the prosecutor offered to
recommend a ninety-day sentence to the judge).
32
Id.
33
Frye, 566 U.S. at 140 (“The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. . . . [a]pplies to “all ‘critical
stages’ of the criminal proceedings.” (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 566 U.S. 778, 786 (2009))).
25
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options can only benefit all parties involved.34 The Court held “[D]efense counsel has a duty to
communicate formal offers…that may be favorable to the accused.”35
The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
that is material to the conviction or punishment of the accused,36 but the Court has yet to address
actual disclosure requirements during plea bargaining.37 In 1963, the Supreme Court extended the
rule on what kind of nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates due process.38 In Brady v. Maryland,
the crime was murder committed in perpetration of a robbery.39 Two men in separately held trials,
were found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death.40 Brady admitted to participating
in the crime, but claimed his partner did it.41 Brady’s attorney requested for the prosecutor to allow
him to examine the partner’s extrajudicial statements.42 In spite of this specified request, the
prosecutor withheld the statement in which Brady’s partner confessed to the murder.43 Following
this case, what is now known as Brady material, includes exculpatory or impeaching information
and evidence that is material to the guilt or innocence or to the punishment of a defendant. 44 The

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (“[I]nformed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and the
noncitizen during the plea-bargaining process. By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense
and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties.”).
35
Frye, 566 U.S. at. 145.
36
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “[s]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
37
See James M. Grossman, Getting Brady Right: Why Extending Brady v. Maryland's Trial Right to Plea Negotiations
Better Protects A Defendant's Constitutional Rights in the Modern Legal Era, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 1525, 1528 (2016)
(noting that Brady v. Maryland’s outcome is a powerful decision for defendants, however, it only reaches criminal
trials and not where it is needed most; plea bargains).
38
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
39
Id. at 84.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See also Grossman, supra note 37, at 1528.
34
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Court found that suppression of this information was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and disclosure is required.45
In U.S. v. Ruiz Supreme Court addressed whether a federal criminal defendant’s plea deal,
which required a waiver of her right to receive exculpatory impeachment material was
constitutional.46 The deal was that if defendant Ruiz waived indictment, trial, and an appeal, the
prosecutor would recommend a two-level downward departure from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.47 Incorporated in the deal was also a waiver to the right to impeachment information
relating to witnesses.48 This “fast track” plea deal would have shortened her sentencing range by
six months; from 18 to 24 months to 12 to 18 months.49 The lower court found that a guilty plea
cannot be voluntary without the impeachment information the defendant was entitled to.50 On
appeal the Ninth Circuit held that criminal defendants are entitled to receive impeachment
information prior to entering a plea agreement.51 The court’s reasoned that the defendant would
have otherwise received this impeachment information before trial and requiring her to waive this
right was unlawful.52 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that “the Constitution does not
require the prosecutor to share all useful information” and permits the court to accept a guilty plea
with waivers of constitutional rights.53 Hence, they reversed the decision, concluding that the
prosecutor does not have to disclose impeachment evidence prior to a plea agreement. 54 What is

Id. at 86-88 (declaring that withholding evidence that can exculpate or reduce the penalty of a defendant “casts the
prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justic[e].”).
46
U.S. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002).
47
Id. at 625.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 626.
53
Id. at 629 (“[T]he more information the defendant has, the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea,
waiver, or decision, and the wiser that decision will likely be.”) (emphasis added).
54
Id. at 629 (concluding the prosecutor does not have to disclose impeachment evidence prior to a plea agreement).
45
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important to note however, is how the Court declared that it was specifically addressing
impeachment evidence only; evidence which is related to the fairness of the process in at a trial.55
Our modern criminal justice system is a system that convicts through pleas rather than
trials. Yet, the safeguards that exist for a defendant during trial hardly extend during the plea
bargaining process. U.S. v. Ruiz made it clear that there is no constitutional right to impeachment
evidence during plea negotiations.56 The Ruiz Court also mentioned that a prosecutor does not
have to divulge everything that is favorable to the defendant; only exculpatory evidence that is
material to conviction or punishment.57 On the other hand, Ruiz did not particularly address “how
to treat [all] exculpatory evidence at plea negotiations.”58 Accordingly, there is a Circuit split on
this issue.59 At least three Circuits have held the disclosure of exculpatory Brady material is
required for a guilty plea to be knowingly and voluntarily valid.60 Others interpret the U.S. v. Ruiz
decision as the prosecution not having a duty to disclose any Brady material during plea
negotiations.61 The state courts are also divided on this question of whether a prosecutor violates
the Brady rule by not disclosing all Brady material during plea bargaining.62

B. Plea Negotiations Are Relatively Unregulated
Prosecutors are empowered with the ideal tools necessary to bring about a certain
consequence. Prosecutorial discretion to bring charges against a defendant, coupled with statutory
minimums or the sentencing guidelines, enables prosecutors to create the terms and results they

55

Id.
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
57
Id. at 630.
58
See Grossman, supra note 37, at 1527.
59
Id. at 1529.
60
Id. at 1544.
61
Id.
62
Id.
56
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would like a particular defendant to end up with.63 For example, in the federal system Title 18
U.S.C. § 3553 (b) instructs, “the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range”
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commissio[n].”64 Although judges are permitted to depart from the range set by the
Sentencing Commission, the Sentencing Guidelines provide prosecutors with the means to pick
the range that goes with the crime they plan to charge with. Senator Cory Booker highlights this
very point when he said we have people pleading guilty to crimes they didn’t commit just because
the mandatory minimums are so excruciating.65
Usually a prosecutor’s offer in exchange for a guilty plea is a reasonable prediction of the
likely sentence. The fact that the guidelines are advisory rather than binding on the judges, does
not make much of a difference. The reality is, most people in society understand that judges listen
to what the prosecutor recommends.66 To such a degree, in the context of plea negotiations, a
defendant’s life is in the prosecutor’s hands. The prosecutor’s choice on what to charge and what
he or she is willing to offer as a deal, plays a huge role on whether the defendant will pled guilty
or exercise their right to a trial. Rightly, various issues call into question whether there truly is

Cf. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1471 (1993) (“The fact that
the sentencing outcome depends substantially on the crime charged permits the prosecutor's charging decisions to
control plea bargaining.”).
64
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22); See U.S. v Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (discussing
prior to Booker, the Sentencing rules were mandatory and binding on sentencing judges. Justice Stevens found that if
these rules were merely advisory instead of binding, the Sixth Amendment would not be implicated).
65
13th: Ava DuVernay, (Netflix Documentary Oct. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Documentary 13th],
https://www.netflix.com/watch/80091741?trackId=13752289&tctx=0%2C0%2C3270d2a9-6f4f-4cca-8e4585e16421a7c3-49625447.
66
See also Frye, 566 U.S. at 143-144 (“To a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel]
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))).
63
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voluntariness in a plea bargain67 and whether some defendants ever have a real choice.
Particularly, when a defendant’s options are between going to prison or entering a guilty plea that
keeps him or her out of prison.
What sets the United States apart from other governments is loyalty to the Constitution,
which is rooted in a system of checks and balances. However, there is nothing to check and balance
prosecutors and the relatively unregulated area of plea bargaining. Missouri v. Frye demonstrates
that when court appearances are not required during the preliminary stages of the plea bargaining
process it is difficult to demonstrate prejudice or voluntariness issues with plea offers. There are
no clear standards or judicial supervision of what a prosecutor decides to offer a particular
defendant or what they discuss with defendants or their defense counsel.68 Padilla v. Kentucky
involved issues with the ineffectiveness of counsel resulting from improper or lack of advice in
entering a guilty plea. However, defendant Frye’s claim was not in reference to the guilty plea
accepted in court, rather, it referred to a stage in plea negotiations where the presence of neither
the defendant, a court reporter, or a judge’s is required. “The real question in cases where
defendants pled guilty, then, should not be whether the plea of any individual defendant is
voluntary or knowing, but whether there is a sufficient check on prosecutors' use of the bargaining
power.”69
It is clear from our body of case law that prosecutorial discretion provides a prosecutor
with tremendous power.70 To make plea bargaining fairer it is obvious we need more participation,

67

See State in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992) (explaining words like voluntary and coercion can change in our
society as wrong doings or crimes evolve. For example, in prior sexual assault cases, it was believed that if a woman
did not resist, the sexual act was deemed voluntary, id. at 434, and the New Jersey Legislature was able to redefine
rape, by removing the need for resistance in order for a sexual act to be involuntary or unlawful, id. at 443.
68
See Frye, 566 U.S. at 142 (explaining this very reason is why the, “[P]lea bargaining process is often in a flu[x].”).
69
Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1049 (2006).
70
See Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 Albany L. Rev. 919, 922 (2017)
(“A legal system in which a prosecutor could convict whomever he liked just by pointing could lead to conviction in
cases in which the prosecutor had no evidence at all.”).
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efficient safeguards and more transparency without lies or manipulation.71 Stephanos Bibas has
explored factual moral and legal inaccuracies in guilty pleas.72 Bibas asserts that because even
completely innocent people submit to the overwhelming pressures of pleading guilty, there has to
be many more with plausible factual, legal or equitable defenses who are also pleading. 73 “Not
only are defendants often in the dark about the evidence for and against them, but they also have
difficulty understanding and evaluating plea deals and the likely consequences.”74 Unlike the civil
system where discovery opportunities allow parties to learn more about their case, depose
witnesses, and serve interrogatories.75 In criminal cases prosecutors hold all the cards76 and only
having to provide exculpatory evidence is not enough when it comes to defendants waiving their
constitutional rights and entering a guilty plea.
Prosecutors subjectively choose the ideal outcome for a particular defendant because they
have the discretion and tools to do so. The plea negotiation process resembles the process of
entering into a contract, except, with plea offers prosecutors always have the upper hand. There
is something inherently wrong when prosecutors are allowed to decide just how vigorous or lenient
they are willing to be with a particular defendant. Some defendants mistakenly believe they
receive a fair deal during plea bargaining even though, in this relatively unregulated area of the
law, biases can easily go unnoticed

71

See Stephanos Bibas, supra note 106, at 1081 (describing because plea bargains were designed to be used in
exceptional cases, little safeguards were put in place and pleas bargains ended up growing below the radar. Bibas is
the Director of the Supreme Court Clinic at University Pennsylvania of Law and won the Padilla v. Kentucky case).
72
Id. at 1055.
73
Id at 1060.
74
Id.
75
See also Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U.
L. Rev. 27 (forthcoming 2017) (“The criminal system promotes settlements by empowering prosecutors to make the
price of going to trial and risking conviction intolerably high for defendants. This leverage enables prosecutors to
force defendants to enter into plea bargains under terms largely dictated by the prosecutor.”)
76
See also Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical
Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. Crim. L & Criminology 1, 14 (2013) (“Through charge
selection and influence over sentencing ranges, prosecutors today possess striking powers to create significant
sentencing differentials.”).
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II.

A PLEA FOR JUSTICE

A. Racial Disparity in Our Criminal Justice System
The fact remains that ninety-four percent of all convictions are guilty pleas resulting from
plea bargains77 and minorities make up more than sixty percent of the prison population.78 These
numbers are indicative that plea bargains are likely to be particularly harmful to racial minorities.
Dr. Vanessa Edkins suggests that in order to explain racial inequities in our prison system we need
to look at the ones who are involved in plea negotiations.79 Part of the reason for racial disparities
in prison has to do with the counsel defendants received from their attorneys, which stems from
prosecutorial discretions.80 However, there is barely any research on how the role of prosecutors
(or defense attorneys) during plea negotiations may contribute to these disparate rates in our
prisons.81 Racial injustice is made worse through plea bargaining because the process is under the
sole discretion of prosecutors who have the freedom to subjectively decide what a particular

77

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143 (2012) (Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of
state convictions are guilty pleas resulting from plea bargains (citing Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Sourcebook of criminal justice statistics Online, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf)).
78
The Sentencing Project., Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, 5 (2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf (“Black men are nearly six times as likely to be incarcerated
as White men and Hispanic men are 2.3 times as likely.”).
79
Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does Zealous Representation Apply
Equally to All?, 35 Law & Hum. Behav. 413, 413 (2011) (“While the effect of race on incarceration may not be a
direct one . . . research has concluded that the disproportionate incarceration rates [of minorities] cannot be explained
simply by higher rates of crime or higher rates of arrest for minorities.”).
80
Id. at 424 (suggesting “to get to the root cause of the racial disparities . . . we need to address how race may be
affecting attorneys’ abilities to zealously represent their clients.” 80 Her study concluded there was differential
treatment from defense attorneys as to recommendations given to a minority client versus a white client. The minority
client was three times more likely to be encouraged to accept a plea that involved jail time than the white client.
Access to more data or research can help determine what is behind these issues and what roles prosecutors and
attorneys have in contributing to these disparities.); See also Alschuler, supra note 70, at 939 (“In their efforts to
persuade clients to pled guilty, defense attorneys . . . emphasize or exaggerate the strength of the prosecutor’s evidence,
emphasize or exaggerate the sentences likely to follow conviction at trial, . . . threaten to withdraw from clients’ cases,
and lie.”); See also Loretta Lynch, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Eighth Annual Judge Thomas A.
Flannery Lecture (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-deliversremarks-eighth-annual-judge-thomas-flannery (explaining how overwhelming cases and fewer resources for public
defenders are why, Ms. Lynch claims, public defenders help their clients by, “[H]elping them pled guilty.” However,
“If everybody insisted on a trial, the whole system would shut down.”).
81
See Vanessa A. Edkins, at 413-414;
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defendant deserves without any safeguards to assure plea offers are not pre-textual; motivated by
personal biases whether it be a defendant’s race or socioeconomic status.
Money and education are powerful resources in making decisions during plea negotiations.
Sadly, racial minority defendants are likely to be poorer and with less education than white
defendants. Josh Bowers explains how even “[i]n, low stakes cases, process costs dominate, and
plea bargaining is a potential way out.”82 Former Attorney General Loretta Lynch describes,
“Those who can afford to pay can quickly move on with their lives. But for those who can’t, these
fees can be a trap door into an intractable cycle of debt, incarceration, and poverty.”83 People who
live in communities where the vast majority have a low socioeconomic status usually share similar
characteristics of low education, low income, and poor health.84 These communities display class
race correlations between ethnic and racial minorities living in these neighborhoods and how likely
they are to be poorer and less educated than whites.85 The United States Census Bureau estimates
a total of 44.9% of Blacks and Hispanics are below poverty level, compared to 8.8% of Whites 86
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Id. at 1134 82 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1132 (2008). (a professor at the
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(stating General Population 73.6% White; Black or African American 12.6%, Hispanic or Latino 17.1%. Percentages
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and only 18.6% of Blacks and Hispanics have attained an educational level of a high school
diploma or above, compared to 66.27% of Whites.87 Racial injustice is made worse by plea
bargaining when a defendant’s socioeconomic status affects the process and there are no
safeguards in place to make sure that what is offered to a rich defendant is equivalent to what is
offered to a poor defendant.
In his role as President, Barack Obama witnessed firsthand “how our criminal justice
system exacerbates inequality.”88 Policies adopted in an effort to control crimes created the
disproportionate effects and racial disparities in our system.89 At the yearend of 2015, prisoners
sentenced to more than one year under state or federal correctional authorities, comprised of
499,400 White prisoners and a total of 842,400 Black and Hispanic prisoners.90 In the United
States one out of nine men are likely to serve time in prison; only one out of seventeen are projected
to be White men, as oppose to one in three Black men, and one in six Hispanic men. 91 For women
the estimates are, one in one-hundred eleven White women, one in eighteen Black women and one
in forty-five Hispanic women.92 The rate of imprisonment per 100,000 in 2015 by gender, race,
and ethnicity are:93
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White women: 52

White men: 457

Black women: 103

Black men: 2,613

Latina women: 63

Latino men: 1,04394

“A large body of research finds that for similar offenses, members of the African American and
Hispanic communities are more likely to be stopped, searched, arrested, convicted, and sentenced
to harsher penalties.”95
In his book Just Mercy, Bryan Stevenson explains how our criminal justice system is
designed to treat individuals who are rich and guilty better than if they are poor and innocent. 96
One example is the case of Kalief Browder.97 Kalief was an African American teenager whose
family could not afford his ten thousand dollar bail nor could they afford any legal representation.98
Kalief had no prior criminal history, had never been arrested, and insisted that not only was he not
guilty, but he had never seen or met the victim.99 In a live interview, Kalief explains he refused to
take a plea deal because he wanted to speak up and bring awareness to society about how our
criminal justice system functions in hopes that his example will cause a change.100 Since his family
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could not afford bail, he was imprisoned at Rikers Island.101 After serving thirty-three months,
refusing to take a plea deal, he was released. Kalief never had a trial and was never convicted.102
While referencing the Kalief Browder case, Liza Jessie Peterson explains our criminal justice
system uses heavier penalties and punishment for defendants who dare to not take a plea bargain
when it is offered.103 President Obama advises, “[S]tates and communities must continue to
examine their own policies so that they do not criminalize poverty.”104
One important aspect that would help poor minority defendants in making a decision
without the dangers of overbearing their will would be if they could be released on bail. Having
the freedom to consult attorneys, family, friends, or just having the capability to look into their
own case, would help even out the unequal bargaining position between an accused and
prosecutorial pressures.105 Former Attorney General Lynch, announced that “[t]housands of
nonviolent, non-felony defendants languish behind bars, not because they have been found guilty
of a crime or pose a flight risk, but simply because they cannot pay.”106 Defendants having the
capability of making decisions while at home as oppose to a precinct or a jail, would help reduce
the coercive effect and pressures that contribute to accepting a guilty plea offer.
Our history of racism is what “continues to drive inequality on how the justice system is
experienced.”107 Bryan Stevenson emphasizes that “[A]cknowledging our nation's history of racial
injustice is critical to addressing a range of contemporary issues.”108 Racial disparities in our
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criminal justice system has existed since the Thirteenth Amendment.

After the Thirteenth

Amendment ended slavery new laws were created designed for the imprisonment of blacks or
former slaves.109

Michelle Alexander explains, “Throughout American History African

Americans have repeatedly been controlled through systems of racial and social control that appear
to die, but then are reborn in new form, tailored to the needs and constraints of the time.” 110 She
describes the New Jim Crow system as mass-incarceration; a system that, “[O]nce again, strips
millions of poor people, overwhelmingly poor people of colo[r].”111 The continued racial patterns
of minorities in our prisons and the disproportionate effects of convictions through plea bargains
validates why plea bargaining is likely to be particularly harmful to racial minorities.

III.
A.

A PLEA FOR MERCY

Work to Be Done
Recently I observed two plea hearings at a U.S. District Court. Formal court hearings are

conducted when defendants decide to enter into a guilty pleas as a result of a plea bargain. This
process was made to have safeguards in place for judges to ensure the defendant’s plea was
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voluntary and that he or she is aware of certain consequences.112 For each defendant there were
two U.S. Marshalls escorting them to their attorney waiting at the defense table. The officers
remained standing about a foot behind the defendant the entire time. The defendants remained in
handcuffs attached to a chain that went around the waist and down to the handcuffs on their ankles.
The defendants were asked whether their plea was voluntarily and whether they were forced or
threatened. It was blatantly obvious the Judge read off some sort of Rule 11 checklist, barely
raising his head to look at the defendants. After a few “yes” or “no” replies, the plea hearing was
complete. As I watched each defendant struggle to sign his plea deal while in handcuffs and
chains, I realized how unrealistic it was for any judge to evaluate the voluntariness of a plea
through this process. Any defendant in this setting clearly is not communicating to the judge that
they were coerced, afraid, or threatened. I wondered what was even the point of this hearing? It
was not so much to ensure the plea was voluntary. It was more to ensure the judges followed what
Rule 11 instructs them to do; by literally just asking if a plea was voluntary. The purpose for Rule
11 was completely out the window.
Justice Scalia in Missouri v. Frye noted the long overdue recognition that “[t]he plea
bargaining process is a subject worthy of regulation.”113 Justice Scalia suggests that the legislature
could handle these issues in a more efficient manner than the Courts. He mocks at the idea of plea
bargains as the “[N]ewly created constitutional field of plea-bargaining law” and the arbitrary
safeguards the Courts have set up.114 Estimating what a defendant would have done or what a
Court would have approved, which depending on the particular case, works the same as calling

See Fed. R. Crim. R. P. 11(b)(2) (instructing a judge on “Ensuring a Plea Is Voluntary” stating to
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result from force, threats, or promises.”).
112

113
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heads or tails.115 The most important statement in Justice Scalia’s dissent is the one that admits
there is no basis for assuming that prosecutors and judges are familiar with boundaries of
acceptable plea bargains and sentences.116
For starters, we need more data to demonstrate how plea bargains contribute to these racial
inequities that area leading to racial disparities in our prisons. There is an urgent need to focus on
the disparate effects and find information that can reveal a pretext for discrimination. Implicit bias
continues to cause racial inequality in our criminal justice system. Thus far, there is enough data
that demonstrates the steep numbers of convictions that result from plea bargains, along with the
disproportionate effects of minorities behind bars. Gathering more information on a prosecutors’
charging practices can help answer questions like, are prosecutors charging more serious offenses
to minority defendants? There is not enough data or research on how plea bargains could be
causing more harm than good, especially to minorities. Plea negotiations remain in the dark and
the lack of data stunts options of elimination or reform. Improvements cannot happen by turning
a blind eye. Data is needed to analyze 1) what type of plea offers are being made to particular
defendants and 2) is there a race or socioeconomic correlation?
There would not be much additional cost in compiling the data needed to evaluate these
factors and formulate statistical data. Most of the data required can stem from the existing police
reports and the plea negotiation agreements. For example, when law enforcement makes an arrest
a description of the accused is documented. These descriptions may include height, weight,
nationality, age, employment, neighborhood, background, etc. When prosecutors prepare plea
agreements they compile their own data to present to the court, which will include what the
defendant was charged with, details of the plea negotiation, including what the defendant was
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offered in exchange for his or her guilty plea, etc. By combining the police reports with the plea
negotiations files can be created to analyze plea offers made to particular defendants. Race class
correlations and socioeconomic status of defendants can be deciphered by having this information.
This big data will help compare plea negotiations and analyze the differences in deals being offered
minority and white defendants. Being able to look at individual cases and answer questions like,
why a particular white defendant and a particular black defendant, charged with the same offense,
receive a better plea offer? Issues of racial injustice in our prison, which is likely stemming from
plea bargains, can be addressed and remedied once we have the information to back up the
inequality.
Once the big data is compiled and we face the racial issues within our criminal justice
system, then the need for reform has to be dealt with. Bail reform has helped many states manage
their prison populations, but not all guilty convictions require imprisonment.

Many plea

agreements actually may keep defendants out of prison with reduced sentences in exchanged for a
guilty plea. However, the issue of having a record still remains. A guilty plea follows a defendant
for the rest of their lives and affects them in society with things like finding employment, voting
rights, where to live, citizenship status, etc. Prosecutors having this great power affects defendants
whether the guilty plea is to imprison or free them. If plea bargains must remain, what must not
remain is all the power prosecutors hold. Prosecutors are not elected officials chosen by the
community. They are paid governmental employees that should not have the power to take away
someone’s liberty without meaningful and significant regulations over that process. Legislators
would be the ideal department to enact laws that would protect the public from the discretionary
powers that a prosecutor has. The power to be vigorous or lenient on a particular defendant should
have a method that ensures equality, fairness and justice for all, not just for some.
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Plea bargains did not always exist. Our criminal system needs it because the case load is
too heavy for our court systems to function without them. However, if for example, a violent
criminal committed an offense, should he be allowed to have a reduced sentence for his crime?
Are we looking to do favors? Do we care if the defendant is guilty or innocent or is the focus on
who has better representation or negotiation powers? In order to fix issues of plea bargaining, we
need to think about what are the true goals of plea bargaining? What is society and the government
looking to accomplish through plea bargaining? Our adversary system includes members of the
jury as a means to convict and since plea bargains have essentially replaced trials, how can the
community be involved in this new form of conviction? Whether we are including members of
the community or electing legislative bodies, the point is that a prosecutor on his own should not
be entitled to the powers equivalent to the judicial or legislative branch of government.
What may seem as an extreme measure would be to just abolish plea bargains. However
what seems more extreme is the number of people being convicted. Without plea bargains,
everyone would need more information, beginning with law enforcement. This would push law
enforcement to be more selective when they make arrests. It would require more investigation and
evidence to have a case strong enough for prosecutors to 1) be able to charge the defendant and 2)
be able to take the case to trial, regardless of their socioeconomic status. The need for enticing
offers in order to pressure defendants who may be innocent into a guilty plea would disappear
along with the plea bargains.117 It could shift the focus from quantity to quality. Abolishing plea
bargains would push law enforcement and prosecutors to focus on the type of crime being
committed, for example, those causing real violent dangers. It can help prioritize those cases that
justify removing defendants from society versus those that could be better off as a house arrest.

117

James M. Grossman, Getting Brady Right: Why Extending Brady v. Maryland's Trial Right to Plea Negotiations
Better Protects A Defendant's Constitutional Rights in the Modern Legal Era, 2016 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1525, 1558 (2016).

23

“Can we implement reforms that both reduce the number of people incarcerated in the
U.S. and the well-known racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system?”118 Looking
at the bigger picture of mass-incarceration helps to reflect on how did we get here, but most
importantly, how do we end this?119 Plea bargaining has become the criminal justice system.120
Allowing plea bargains to continue producing unjust results, undermines the character of our
society and our commitment to fairness. The United States has a colorful history full of lessons
from its own wars, ignorance, mistakes, and racial injustice. History has taught us that we move
forward towards a better future by being able to live amongst each other. Putting a defendant
behind bars and stripping their freedom does not strip the injustice a relative or friend might feel
for the accused. When communities do not trust their own governments, it leads to riots,
retaliation, and violence. Ignoring the likelihood that plea bargains are oppressing minorities, ends
up affecting our society as a whole.
Professor Angel Davis describes, “Historically when one looks at efforts to create reforms,
they inevitably lead to more repression.”121 If we continue riding this along with ignorance to the
fact that over ninety-four percent of convictions are produce through plea bargains AND that there
is a disproportionate amount of minorities in prison, our society will end up suffering the
consequences, just like our historical past. “[O]ur system of the administration of justice suffers
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when any accused is treated unfairly.”122 It is difficult to reconstruct a system that is so broken,
which is why plea bargaining needs more than just a reform, it needs a complete makeover.123
Adding safeguards to a system that is already broken would be equivalent to putting on a band-aid
on an already infected wound. For this reason, starting from the ground up, or abolishing plea
bargaining all together, may be the only realistic remedies.

CONCLUSION
Through plea bargaining the illusion of liberty, justice and mercy is dealt, leaving
defendants with a false sense of satisfaction. The disproportionate effects of plea bargaining and
incarceration with minority defendants, especially indigent minorities, demonstrates the inequality
that stems from this process. Racial injustice is made worse through plea bargaining because the
process is under the sole discretion of prosecutors who have the freedom to subjectively decide
what a particular defendant deserves without any safeguards to assure plea offers are not motivated
by pre-textual biases. Our pledge of allegiance to the flag concludes with liberty and justice for
all; ironically, the current criminal justice system and its allegiance to plea bargaining ends with
liberty and justice only for some.
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